Low or negative pressure transients in water distribution systems, caused by unexpected events (e.g. power outages) or routine operation/maintenance activities, are usually brief and thus are rarely monitored or alarmed. Previous studies have shown connections between negative pressure events in water distribution systems and potential public health consequences. Using a quantitative microbial risk assessment (QMRA) model previously developed, various factors driving the risk of viral infection from intrusion were evaluated, including virus concentrations external to the distribution system, maintenance of a disinfectant residual, leak orifice sizes, the duration and the number of nodes drawing negative pressures. The most sensitive factors were the duration and the number of nodes drawing negative pressures, indicating that mitigation practices should be targeted to alleviate the severity of low/negative pressure transients. Maintaining a free chlorine residual of 0.2 mg/L or above is the last defense against the risk of viral infection due to negative pressure transients. Maintaining a chloramine residual did not appear to significantly reduce the risk. The effectiveness of ensuring separation distances from sewer mains to reduce the risk of infection may be system-specific. Leak detection/repair and cross-connection control should be prioritized in areas vulnerable to negative pressure transients.
INTRODUCTION
Pressure transients in water distribution systems, also called water hammer or surge, are pressure waves generated due to pipeline elasticity and water compressibility when a system changes rapidly from one flow condition to another (Walski et al. ) . For a quick estimation of the transient magnitude, every 0.3 m/sec (1 ft/sec) of velocity change can result in a pressure transient of 276 to 414 kPa (40 to 60 psi), depending on the pipe material, the quantities of entrapped air, etc. A pressure wave of this magnitude could raise or drop a system pressure of 414 kPa (60 psi) above 689 kPa (100 psi) or below 138 kPa (20 psi), respectively, which is beyond the recommended ranges for a water distribution system in the United States (Ten State Standards ). The pressure wave can propagate throughout a distribution system causing high and low/negative pressures in locations miles away from the origin of the event. Low/negative pressure transients are usually brief and thus are rarely monitored or alarmed. But even for a few seconds, low/negative pressures can create a force driving contaminants from the external soil and water environment into the distribution system. Utility survey results (Kirmeyer et al. ) showed that at least 20% of the surveyed systems had pipes below the water table and about 20% systems reported 25%-75% of meter boxes flooded during different seasons.
Because pressure transients can propagate throughout a distribution system, the local magnitude of the pressure transients can be complicated by the characteristics of control devices, and quantities of entrapped air. The occurrence of pressure transients may be common, as these transients can be caused by routine distribution system operation and maintenance activities such as valve closure, main breaks/repairs, hydrant flushing, and pump start/shutoff (Walski et al. ) . Gullick et al. () studied transient occurrences in full-scale distribution systems for extended periods (up to 1.6 years) and observed 15 surge events that resulted in negative pressures. Details about these systems can be found in the project report (Friedman et al. ) . In the study, 40 events were observed with pressures below 138 kPa (20 psi) and negative pressure transients occurred in three of seven full-scale distribution systems. Most negative pressure transients (12 out of 15) were caused by the sudden shutdown of pumps at a pump station because of either unintentional (e.g. power outages) or intentional circumstances (e.g. pump stoppage or startup tests). The duration of pressure transients can be influenced by flow control operations and system characteristics such as presence of storage tanks, entrained air, and pipe leaks, which can significantly dampen transients. Gullick et al. () showed that the negative pressures lasted from 1 second to more than 160 seconds in four of eight studied distribution systems. The volume of intrusion can range from milliliters to thousands of liters depending on the effective size of the orifice, external pressure, and the nature of the transient event (Kirmeyer et al. ) . Pilot-scale investigations estimated intrusion volumes up to 50 mL and 127 mL through 3.2 mm (1/8 in) and 6.4 mm (1/4 in) orifices, respectively, when 8.3 L/sec (132 gpm) of flow was brought to a stop with the sudden closure (,1 second) of a 64 mm (2.5 in) ball valve (Boyd et al. a, b) .
Public health impact
The intrusion of microbial contaminants due to low or negative pressure transients is of great concern because even with dilution, some microbes can cause an infection with a single organism (LeChevallier et al. ; Teunis et al. About 56% of the samples were found positive for human enteric viruses. In addition, total fecal coliform levels in some soil samples were greater than 1.6 Â 10 4 CFU/100 g of soil, suggesting the sampling locations were potentially under the influence of leaking sewage pipes. An epidemiological study by Payment et al. () suggested that the distribution system was at least partially responsible for increased levels of gastrointestinal illnesses. Kirmeyer et al.
() conducted surge modeling for the distribution system of the epidemiological study and found that the system was extremely vulnerable to negative pressures.
More than 90% of the nodes in the system were estimated to draw negative pressures under certain modeling scenarios (e.g. power outages). In the absence of other plausible explanations, low disinfectant residuals and the system vulnerability to negative pressure transients were speculated to contribute to the viral-like etiology of the observed illnesses in the epidemiological study (LeChevallier et al. There are few published studies using QMRA to assess the health risk associated with pathogen intrusion due to negative pressure transients in water distribution systems.
Research is needed to better characterize the risks (e.g. respectively. Service pressures ranged typically from 276 to 689 kPa (40 to 100 psi). The system had one pressure gradient, two elevated storage tanks, four wells, and five pump stations (four for the wells and one in the distribution system). Figure 1 shows the hydraulic model of the studied system and the 118 nodes (11%) that were predicted to be susceptible to intrusion (assuming that every model node had a leak for potential intrusion). The transient-producing InfoSurge (MWH Soft Inc., Pasadena CA, USA) was used to conduct the surge modeling. Transient events due to pump shutdown were simulated for 120 sec. Gullick et al.
() observed that most negative pressure events due to transients last less than 2 min. As a worst-case scenario, transient events were analyzed when a maximum flow rate was supplied to the system. The duration of pump shutdown was modeled to be 1 sec. The check valve at each pump was modeled to close within 0.1 sec of sensing reverse flow. The check valve resistance was set to 11 sec 2 /m 2 (1 sec 2 /ft 2 ) and a wave speed of 1,100 m/sec (3,600 ft/sec) was assumed for the system. More details of the surge modeling procedure are described elsewhere (Fleming et al. ) .
Exposure assessment
Upon intrusion, the intruded viruses are suspended and diluted in the local water flow (assuming no attachment/ detachment of virus from pipe wall). Assuming an intrusion volume V intr (L, gal) of sewage, containing a concentration C v (PDU/L) of viruses, enters the system at a location (at node k) where the flow rate is Q k (L/sec, gpm) so that during a negative pressure duration Δ 1 (sec, min) a volume Q k Δ 1 (L, gal) passes through the leaking node, the virus con-
EPANET, the hydraulic modeling software developed by the USEPA (Rossman ) , was used to analyze system hydraulics and virus transport within the system. Hydraulic and water quality simulations were run over a 24 hour period with a hydraulic time step of 0.1 hour (6 min), a water quality 
where N is the number of microorganisms after exposure to a disinfectant residual; N 0 is the number of microorganisms before disinfectant additions; k i is an inactivation constant The consumption of tap water at any node depends on the number of customers receiving water from that node and their individual intake of unheated tap water. The service population at a node was determined by distributing the total population across all system nodes weighted by the water demand allocated at each node. An average service and approximated by a lognormal distribution with a median water consumption of 0.18 L. The daily intake volume was assumed to be randomly consumed completely once a day by a customer and at any time of the day.
Risk characterization
After the exposure assessment, a risk model was developed using Monte Carlo simulation programmed in Mathematica (Wolfram Research Inc., Champaign IL, USA). The Monte
Carlo simulation was run with 1,000 repetitions. During each Monte Carlo repetition, the following random variables were generated or derived: external virus levels, intrusion volume, intrusion duration, dilution factor, virus levels after dilution, number of customers drinking water at a model node, and individual water intake volume.
After estimation of the population exposed and the virus doses consumed, the dose response models were incorporated to estimate the numbers of waterborne infections and the risk of infection. The infectivity of norovirus had been inferred from human challenge studies (Teunis et al. ) and human dose responses were established in PCR-based units. The dose response model was characterized by a beta-probability distribution of infectivity for a single norovirus particle. The model indicated high infectivity of the virus, e.g., exposure to a single norovirus could cause infection in about 30% of exposed population.
Sensitivity analysis
To elucidate the effectiveness of various mitigation measures for public health protection, a sensitivity analysis was conducted for various operational and controllable risk factors. Risk of infection was estimated under a baseline scenario and a variety of mitigation scenarios for best practice development. Table 2 summarizes the baseline and various mitigation scenarios under which the risk driving factors were varied. The risk factors in the sensitivity analysis included the external virus concentrations, maintaining disinfectant residuals, negative pressure duration, the number of intrusion nodes, and leak sizes. The sensitivity to each contributing factor was evaluated by applying different multipliers or fixing the factor at different values while allowing the other factors to vary throughout their respective ranges.
External virus concentrations
Under the baseline conditions, virus levels external to the distribution system were randomly generated based on virus occurrence levels in raw sewage, i.e. the worst case.
Actual virus levels at intrusion locations can be much lower. First, sewer pipes are usually not in immediate Under the baseline condition, negative pressure durations at intrusion nodes were randomly generated based on the published data with a median about 10 sec and ranging from ,1 sec to 165 sec (Gullick et al. ) . To study the sensitivity of risk to the negative pressure duration, this parameter was set at a value of 1, 10, 20, 100, 500, or 1,000 sec.
Number of nodes drawing negative pressures
Another direct outcome of reducing the magnitude of negative pressure transients is the reduced number of nodes experiencing negative pressures. A previous surge modeling study of 16 distribution systems (Fleming et al. ) predicted susceptibilities to negative pressure during a power outage ranged from 1 to 98% with a median susceptibility of about 30%. These percentages suggested that the risk of infection may vary widely for different distribution systems due to different vulnerability to negative pressures. Table 3 summarizes four different transient-producing events simulated by surge modeling to estimate different percentages of nodes experiencing negative pressures. The estimated percentages of nodes drawing negative pressures ranged from 6.0 to 85%. were not surfaced or observed, the sizes might be much smaller. In this study, the orifice discharge equation was used to estimate an equivalent orifice diameter for all leaks in the studied system.
where Q is leakage flow rate (L/sec, gpm); C disc is discharge coefficient; C f is unit conversion factor (0.111 SI, 29.8 Imperial); D is orifice diameter (cm, in); and P is pressure (kPa, psi).
If the system was assumed to have 10% of leakage water (2.3 Â 10 3 m 3 /day or 417 gpm), 414 kPa (60 psi) of discharge pressure, 1,128 leaks (one leak per node), and a discharge coefficient of 0.8 at each leak, the equivalent orifice diameter was estimated to be 1.3 mm (0.05 in). The sensitivity of risk to the size of the leak was evaluated under two scenarios: half and twice the estimated equivalent orifice diameter (0.66 mm and 2.6 mm). Under these two scenarios, the intrusion volumes randomly generated at the intrusion nodes were reduced to 25% and increased to 400% of the baseline values, respectively.
Impact of the randomness of risk factors
To compare the contribution from the randomness of individual risk factors to the variation of the infection risk, a fixed sensitivity analysis was also conducted for the risk of norovirus infection. The variation of the infection risk to each contributing factor was evaluated by fixing the risk factor at the respective average value while allowing the other factors to vary throughout their respective ranges. Random factors in the fixed analysis included external virus concentrations, negative pressure duration, the intrusion volume at any node, the number of individual intake events at any node (node population), water consumption during an intake event, and infectivity of the virus.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Risk characterization
Under the baseline conditions, the studied system was estimated to have a median infection risk of 2.1 Â 10 À4 for norovirus due to a single negative pressure transient event. 
External virus concentrations
The variation of external virus concentrations appeared to have no significant impact on the risk of infection (Figure 2(a) ). Increasing the external norovirus levels by 2 orders of magnitude was estimated to increase the median risk only slightly (from 2.1 Â 10 À4 to 2.5 Â 10 À4 ). Decreasing the external virus levels by 4 orders of magnitude had a modest reduction of the median risk (2.1 Â 10 À4 to 3.4 Â 10 À5 ). These results suggest that mitigation measures target to reduce external virus levels might not be effective.
Due to the high infectivity of the selected viruses, low doses of highly infectious viruses may still cause most exposed populations to be infected.
Disinfectant residual maintenance
Maintaining a disinfectant residual had a significant impact on the fate of intruded viruses. only had a modest reduction on the risk (from 2.1 Â 10 À4 to 1.1 Â 10 À4 ), despite 95% of viruses removed or inactivated after 4 hours. These results are due to the high infectivity of norovirus, i.e., although a significant portion of norovirus had been removed or inactivated, the remaining norovirus may still cause most exposed populations to be infected. If the system maintained a free chlorine residual of 0.2 mg Cl 2 /L or higher, the median risk of infection was reduced to insignificant levels (,10 À7 ). This is because a free chlorine residual of 0.2 mg Cl 2 /L or higher could overcome the initial chlorine demand of wastewater intrusion and free chlorine is an effective biocide for virus inactivation. The intruded viruses were estimated to be completely eliminated within 30 minutes after entering the system.
Negative pressure duration
The risk of infection was most sensitive to the duration of negative pressure (Figure 2(c) ). The median risk with a negative pressure duration of 10 seconds was estimated to be 2.1 Â 10
À4
. Reducing the negative pressure duration to 1 sec reduced the median risk below the acceptable risk level of 10 À4 to 9.2 Â 10 À5 . Increasing the duration from 10 to 1,000 sec increased the median risk of infection by about 2 orders of magnitude. The duration of the negative pressure events influences the amount of sewage entering the system as well as the dilution factor. More importantly, the duration of the negative pressure events determines the probability that a person's consumption of water would coincide with the occurrence of viruses in the distributed tap water. The longer the duration, the more likely that people will be exposed to the contaminated water. Negative pressure events with a prolonged duration may impose significant risk on the exposed population. Although typical low/negative pressure events may not last more than 2 min, longer durations of depressurization (e.g. 500 and 1,000 sec) may occur after a power outage or large water main break. These long periods of depressurization may cause significant risks to public health, which should trigger the issuance of a Boil Water Advisory.
Number of intrusion nodes
Four different transient-producing events were modeled to cause the percentage of nodes experiencing negative pressures from 6.0% to 85% (see Table 3 ). 
Impact of the randomness of risk factors
The contribution from the randomness of individual factors to the variation of norovirus infection risk is compared in Figure 4 . The strongest influence on the risk variation was due to the variability of the negative pressure duration. All other factors contributed much less. As discussed earlier, the negative pressure duration is highly important because it drives the probability that water consumption would coincide with the occurrence of the contamination slug. In a small system there is a definite chance that intrusion due to negative pressure transients of only a few seconds will not cause any infection because of the low probability that people will drink the water precisely when the slug of contamination is present.
Best practices for risk mitigation
The sensitivity analysis elucidated two primary mechanisms to mitigate risk: 1) reduce the exposure or 2) reduce/eliminate the pathogen concentration at the time/location of water consumption. For pathogens with high infectivity (e.g. viruses), risk mitigation practices that control exposure, (i.e. reduce the probability that people will be exposed to the contamination during a water intake event), are likely to be the most effective.
Optimized pressure management
Reducing the duration or the number of nodes experiencing Surge modeling and pressure monitoring should be conducted to validate the effectiveness of the adopted device and strategies for transient control.
Disinfectant residual maintenance
The risk results in this study demonstrated the importance of maintaining an adequate disinfectant residual as the final barrier for protecting public health in the event of intrusion within the distribution system. To overcome the potential initial demand of the intrusion, a free chlorine residual of However, dispersion may increase the duration of pathogen presence, which increases the probability of consumption of contaminated water. For intrusion with highly infectious viruses, dispersion may significantly increase the risk of infection. Research on dispersion and the other issues discussed above is needed to improve the development of quantitative microbial risk modeling and assist developing best operation practices to mitigate the risk.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The risk of infection from intrusion due to low/negative pressure transients in distribution systems was most sensitive to the duration and the number of nodes experiencing negative pressures, suggesting that optimized pressure management to control negative pressure transients would be the most effective tool to mitigate the risk. Via a combination of hydraulic/surge modeling, pressure monitoring, and transient pressure mitigations, an optimized pressure management program will yield utility-specific best practices such as adding new hydropneumatic tanks/floating storages, upsizing water mains, etc.
Maintaining an adequate free chlorine residual (e.g.
0.2 mg/L or above) is the last defense against the risk of viral infection due to low/negative pressure transients.
Maintaining a chloramine residual did not appear to significantly reduce the risk of infection under the studied conditions. For utilities that use chloramines as disinfectant residual, other preventive measures (e.g. pressure management and surge protection) should be emphasized to a greater extent to reduce the public health risks.
Ensuring adequate separation distance from sewer mains, leak detection and repair, and cross-connection control may reduce pathogen levels and chlorine demand of the contaminant intrusion into the drinking water pipes. These practices should be prioritized in area vulnerable to negative pressure transients to reduce the risks of microbial infection.
Flushing is simplest and most effective approach to remove contaminants if administered in time.
